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I. Introduction: Rethinking International Organizations 
 
International organizations (IOs) are ubiquitous. More than two 
hundred IOs1 touch our everyday lives. Their missions vary. The United 
Nations (UN) plays a significant role in securing global peace and order 
as it address international conflicts and fights terrorism.2 The World 
Bank is the world’s largest external funder of education.3 Other IOs also 
impact numerous daily issues, such as air travel (The International Civil 
Aviation Organization), banking (The Bank for International 
Settlements), mail (The Universal Postal Union), flu-shots (The World 
Health Organization), and mobile phones (The International 
Telecommunications Union), to name a few.4 It would be only a “modest 
exaggeration” to claim that IOs now cover every practical aspect of 
human enterprise.5 
However, conventional political scientists seldom pay IOs 
sufficient attention that, given their contemporary prominence, they 
thoroughly deserve. Conventional international relations (IR) scholars 
tend to consider IOs as mere passive machineries which states create 
and maneuver according to their functional needs. Under this position, 
while IOs may facilitate inter-state cooperation and reduce transaction 
costs, they never have a life of their own.6 Conventional IR theories 
hardly offer a satisfactory explanation for the distinctive phenomenon of 
IOs’ institutional dynamics in which a specific IO, as a separate and 
autonomous organic entity, grows, evolves and eventually makes sense 
of its own existence.  
                                                 
1 See e.g., The Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International 
Organizations, Appendix 3: Table 1 (Number of International Organizations in This 
Edition by Type (2005/2006), available at 
http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-2004.pdf. In this Essay, I mean by 
international organizations “intergovernmental” organizations. 
2 See e.g., United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1822, adopted on Jun. 20, 2008 
(S/RES/1822 (2008)), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/404/90/PDF/N0840490.pdf?Ope
nElement (resolving to freeze financial assets used for terrorist activities).  
3 World Bank, Ten Things That You Never Knew about the World Bank, available at 
http://digitalmedia.worldbank.org/tenthings/en/1.php.  
4 See generally THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
100 WAYS IT SHPAES OUR LIVES (2006). 
5 FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING v (2nd 
ed. 1993). 
6 See Gayl D. Ness & Steven R. Brechin, Bridging the Gap: International 
Organizations as Organizations, 42 INT’L ORG. 245, 246 (1988); Harold K. Jacobson et 
al., National Entanglements and International Government Organizations, 80 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 141-59 (1986). 
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Accordingly, conventional IR theories largely fail to deliver 
adequate narratives on how a particular IO, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), molds its institutional self as it interacts with the 
environment in which it is situated. Unsurprisingly, conventional IR 
scholars tend to limit their analytical focus to the creation of an IO and 
the inter-state dynamics leading up to its creation. Accordingly, an IO’s 
institutional change remains an “under-studied” and “under-theorized” 
issue of the conventional IR framework. 7  This is an unfortunate 
deficiency in light of ever-increasing significance of IOs in the 
contemporary world. 
This Essay offers a novel perspective which attempts to overcome 
the aforementioned deficiency in conventional IR theories. Drawing on 
the “identity theory” established by Erik Erikson, this Essay captures an 
IO’s institutional development in which one can witness a dynamic 
process of its identity crisis and identity formation. The Essay argues 
that based on its autonomy qua organization, not merely as an 
instrument of states, an IO forms its organizational identity as it 
experiences an “identity crisis” in a similar way in which a human-being 
does. Initially, states create an IO to serve a specific function. Thus, an 
IO may hold a default purpose which its creators (states) have 
programmed into it. However, an IO’s retention of such programmed 
purpose results from a mere identification with its creators, not from the 
genuine identity which it has formed at subsequent stages during  the 
course of its institutional evolution. An IO acquires its organizational 
identity only after it achieves a necessary level of institutional maturity 
as a result of incessant interactions and communications with its 
environment (society).  
Certainly, it is a process no less daunting to an IO than to a 
human-being because an IO also suffers strains and pressures over its 
role expectation in the international society. Just as an adolescent 
experiences an identity crisis in his or her interaction with peers and 
society in general, an IO is exposed to a similar ordeal in adjusting its 
goals to various external pressures. In particular, an IO often undergoes 
a testing situation under which its old structure has become increasingly 
incapable of coping with new demands from the altered environment. 
Confronted with this crisis, an IO may attempt to reconfigure its 
institutional setting by fine-tuning its original teleology to a call from 
the new environment. Only then will its institutional existence continue 
to hold relevance and therefore  enable it to achieve its genuine 
institutional identity. 
                                                 
7 Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: 
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 655 (2006). 
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Markedly, law and legal discourse provide an important platform 
in which one can investigate, comprehend and elucidate the formation 
of an IO’s organizational identity. As a product of legal documents 
(charters or conventions) and a holder of legal personality, an IO bases 
its everyday operations on legal principles and legal reasoning. Its 
routinized and regularized operations, such as “making consistent 
decisions on similar facts” and “giving reasoned arguments based on 
principles other than mere promotion of [a state]’s self-interest,” furnish 
an IO with rich normative foundations essential in shaping its unique 
identity. 8  This identity, once achieved, is self-referential in that it 
functions as a normative standard which regulates an IO’s future 
behaviors. In this sense, an IO’s policies are a teleological realization of 
its identity. Such a teleological identity-formation may even help launch 
various reform agendas as it can locate particular conditions under 
which an individual IO can perform effectively in certain stages of its 
institutional development.9 
Against this background, this Essay attempts to theorize an IO’s 
institutional development qua organization from the standpoint of 
identity formation. This Essay also tests the theory it proposes by 
applying it to the WTO. At this juncture, an important disclaimer is in 
order. The Essay does not venture to analyze every aspect of an IO’s 
identity formation. Admittedly, such process may connote many other 
deeper and broader issues which exceed the scope of the Essay. In 
particular, it leaves unanswered a delicate interplay between an IO and 
its members in the course of the former’s identity formation process. 
Rather, the Essay aims to offer a panoramic view on this critical process 
and serve as a preliminary yet useful avenue for further discussions in 
this largely nascent field of IO theories. 
The Essay unfolds in the following sequence. Part II discusses a 
theoretical foundation of the whole analysis, i.e., the autonomy of an IO. 
One cannot construct an IO’s genuine identity without certain autonomy 
from its members (states). Specifically, Part II draws on the views of 
constructivism and organizational sociology, which focus on the 
autonomy of organizations in contrast with conventional IR theories 
which regard IOs as mere instruments of states. Part II also highlights 
that the identity formation is a normative process which rules and legal 
discourse operate. 
Part III then constructs a theory of identity formation of IOs. Part 
III introduces anthropomorphism in the IO’s identity formation, which 
lays a firm ground for a cross-disciplinary investigation informed by 
developmental psychology. After sketching Erik Erikson’s celebrated 
                                                 
8 FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING viii (2d 
ed. 1993). 
9 See Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 271. 
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identity theory, Part III applies the theory to the IOs’ context. It also 
delineates various parameters of identity formation, such as history, 
environment, goals and technology. Finally, Part IV applies the theory of 
IOs’ identity formation to the WTO. Part IV demonstrates how the WTO 
has experienced an identity crisis as the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)’s original pro-trade bias embraced new challenges 
involving non-trade values, such as protection of the environment and 
human health. Part IV contends that the WTO’s identity formation 
(achievement) is to strike an institutional equilibrium between 
traditional trade values and these non-trade values. Part V concludes.  
 
II. Autonomy and Identity of International Organizations 
 
A. A Political Perspective 
 
Conventional international relations (IR) theories, particularly 
realism and regime theories, regard IOs as passive machinery, or “empty 
shells,” of interstate cooperation. From a narrow functionalist 
standpoint, these theories pose that sovereign states create and operate 
IOs for a better world system by “enmeshing” them in mutually 
beneficial economic transactions.10 As Robert Keohane aptly observed, 
this “rationalistic” approach highlights IOs’ functional merits, such as 
reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, in the absence of any 
specific institutional context. 11  This is basically an “economistic” 
approach based on the assumption that states prioritize their interests in 
order to maximize efficiency and thus use IOs as a rational instrument 
to achieve such goals.12 
Perhaps this rather inorganic view of IOs may be a logical 
conclusion to most IR theories which are state-oriented: they are 
basically “theories about states.”13 They aim to analyze and understand 
why and how states interact and cooperate among themselves, which is 
aptly encapsulated in their appellation itself, “inter-national relations.” 
                                                 
10 Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 246; Harold K. Jacobson et al., supra note _, at _.  
11 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q. 
379, 390 (1988). 
12 Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of 
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699, 702 (1999); THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS _ (1991) (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. 
Powell eds. 1991); Anna Grandori, Notes on the Use of Power and Efficiency 
Constructs in the Economics and Sociology of International Organizations, in 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES _ (S. Lindenberg & H. 
Shreuder eds. 1993). 
13 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _, at 706. 
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Therefore, such “statist ontology” 14  embedded in conventional IR 
theories treat IOs as instruments, not as self-governing, purposive actors 
enjoying “ontological independence.”15 Under this framework, even if 
IOs may facilitate or constrain certain state behaviors by creating and 
controlling the flow of information between states, such “causal status” 
still does not grant IOs autonomy.16 To conventional IR theorists, any 
meaningful contributions by IOs are made, after all, through and by 
states. In an attempt to deepen their understanding the dynamics of IOs, 
some IR scholars employ the rational choice theory. Their framework, 
which defines IOs as “agents” of states (“principals”), conceptually 
enables IOs to become autonomous actors in the first place.17 However, 
this approach is soon confronted by a dilemma in that conventional IR 
theories are unable to provide a theoretical foundation for the very 
independence of agents (IOs). Without this foundation the whole agent-
principal relationship framework collapses.18 
Absent autonomy, actual operation (evolution) of IOs in its post-
creation stages “remains under-examined and under-theorized.”19 While 
“identify[ing] hypotheses about IO change” may be inferred from the 
conventional IR theories centering on why and how states create IOs,20 
those hypotheses nonetheless remain unsatisfactory since an 
institutional change itself tends to be at odds with conventional IR 
theories. Change is either “assumed away”21 or thrust upon IOs by their 
creators, i.e., states, in accordance with changes in national interests or 
state preferences.22 Therefore, change is nothing but a re-creation of IOs 
by states due to asymmetrical external shocks, such as disasters,23 rather 
than an evolutionary or adaptive process resulting from continuous, 
incremental institutional development. In sum, any institutional 
                                                 
14 Id., at 700. 
15 Id., at 704. 
16 Id. 
17 Roland Vaubel, A Public Choice View of International Organization, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION _ (Roland Vaubel & Thomas 
Willett eds. 1991); Patricia Dillon et al., Approaches to the Study of International 
Organizations: Major Paradigms in Economics and Political Science, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION _ (Roland Vaubel & Thomas 
Willett eds. 1991). 
18 Id. 
19 Helfer, supra note _ , at 658. 
20 Id. 
21 Id., at 661; Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections between Historical 
and Rational Choice Institutionalism, in PREFERENCES AND SITUATIONS: POINTS OF 
INTERSECTION BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 1, 7 (Ira 
Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005). 
22 Helfer, supra note _ , at 661. 
23 Id., at 662. 
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changes of IOs are reduced back to international cooperation among 
states.24  
 Moreover, since conventional IR theories regard IOs as mere 
instruments, like nuts and bolts, they often fail to heed the unique 
attributes and contexts which are deeply associated with each 
organization’s autonomy and identity. Therefore, they tend to treat even 
effective IOs in the same way as “those that are near moribund.”25 “Few 
have noted that organizations differ over time, or that they perform 
differently from one another, or that they achieve their ends with 
varying effectiveness or efficiency.”26 
In contrast with an inorganic approach to IOs by conventional IR 
theorists, which leaves little room for organizational autonomy-cum-
identity, an organic, sociological approach enables a theoretical 
emancipation of IOs from their creators (states). IOs are “live 
collectivities” interrelating with the environment. 27  This approach 
focuses on the “social content” of the organization, i.e., “its culture, its 
legitimacy concerns, dominant norms that govern behavior and shape 
interests, and the relationship of these to a larger normative and cultural 
environment.” 28  According to the Weberian bureaucracy theory and 
sociological institutionalist approaches, the “rational-legal” authority 
which the bureaucracy of IOs generates endogenously attains an 
independent status separate from their actors (states). 29  Here, 
bureaucracy is defined as an internal mechanism of IOs which creates 
norms and social knowledge. 30  The existence of an independent 
bureaucracy in IOs (such as “Eurocrats” in the European Union31) or an 
independent organizational culture (such as the World Bank32) tends to 
debunk the conventional view that IOs are a mere passive machinery of 
states.33.  
Yet, IOs’ autonomy gains more theoretical salience in the 
“natural” (open) system perspective than the Weberian “rational” 
system perspective. While Max Weber highlights the rational-legal 
authority of bureaucracy, this authority may still be translated as a tool 
to states in that it is “blue-printed” to achieve rationally pre-deliberated 
                                                 
24 Keohane, supra note _ , at 379. 
25 Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 247. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _ , at 706. 
29 Id., at 699. 
30 Id.  
31 See Mark Pollack, Delegation, Agency, and Agenda-Setting in the European 
Community, 51 INT’L ORG. 99, _ (1997). 
32 See Robert Wade, Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: 
The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective, 217 NEW LEFT REV. 3, _ (1996). 
33 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _, at 705. 
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and pre-programmed goals. 34  In contrast, the “natural” system 
perspective views an IO as “social groups attempting to adapt and 
survive in their particular circumstances.”35 Therefore, organizations are 
capable of modifying their original goals to survive in the changing 
environment. They become “ends in themselves.” 36  Philip Selznick’s 
celebrated “institutional” approach perfects this theory of organizational 
autonomy from the standpoint of this natural (open) system. 
Institutionalization distinguishes organizations from mere cybernetic 
machinery that passively channels states’ inputs. Selznick defines 
institutionalization as “the emergence of orderly, stable, socially 
integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely organized, or narrowly 
technical activities.”37  Through the process of institutionalization, an 
organization obtains both special capacity and character,38 while also 
establishing its value.39  
Focusing on the autonomy of an individual organization means 
taking “variance” among IOs seriously, including variance in their 
performance (such as effectiveness or efficiency) as well as variables 
influencing such performance (such as environments).40 In particular, 
the “environmental changes [that] produced changes in organizational 
structure and behavior.” 41  Admittedly, the “regime theory,” an 
adaptation from realism, also focuses on “specific” institutions in which 
states routinely cooperate over certain issues in order to reduce 
uncertainty and transaction costs, provide information, and stabilize 
expectations, even in the absence of “hierarchical authority.”42 Critically, 
however, this sector-specific regime still remains a cooperative 
relationship among sovereign states – no matter how strong their 
cooperation may be – and not an independent organization. As a 
corollary, the regime theory fails to address two important 
organizational issues. First, it cannot fully explain an organic interaction 
between IOs and the environment. Second, it cannot evaluate whether 
                                                 
34 RICAHRD W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 53 (3d 
ed. 1992); Alvin W. Gouldner, Organizational Analysis, in ROBERT MERTON ET AL., 
SOCIOLOGY TODAY 404-05 (1959). 
35 SCOTT, supra note _, at 57. 
36 Id.  
37 LOONARD BROOM & PHILIP SELZNICK, SOCIOLOGY 238 (1955). 
38 Philip Selznick, Institutionalism “Old” and “New,” 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 270, _ (1996). 
39 PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION 17 (1957). 
40 Ness & Brechin, supra note _, at 248. 
41 Id., at 254. See also Matthias Finger & Bérangère Ruchat, The Transformation of 
International Public Organizations: The Case of UNCTAD, Working Paper de 
l’IDHEAP 14/2000, Nov. 2000, at 3. (discussing “organizational transformation” 
which an IO experiences in order to “bring organizational structure, culture, and 
purpose in line with perceived environmental requirements”). 
42 Keohane, supra note _, at 386. 
An Identity Crisis of International Organizations 
 8 
each regime is legitimate and/or effective qua organization since all the 
performance of the regime is attributable logically to states. 
 In fact, the notion of organizational autonomy parallels the way 
in which ordinary people perceive IOs. While people may criticize the 
WTO for its various deficiencies as an organization, they seldom criticize 
its members, especially big ones, such as the United States and the 
European Union for those deficiencies. This is why organizational 
autonomy may offer a deeper theoretical underpinning for a 
constitutional analysis of IOs than the positivistic framework asserted by  
the regime theory . 
 
B. A Legal Perspective 
 
The Westphalian tradition of public international law, built on 
the notion of state sovereignty, could not conceive the existence of any 
separate polity or organization which would affect states’ monopoly of 
power. The only restriction to the sovereign power was self-restriction: 
treaties created by sovereign states’ consent could only regulate states 
concerned not because those treaties constituted an autonomous 
organization of higher hierarchy but because sovereign states had given 
their word. However, after states had witnessed the fatal flaw of this 
Hobbesian view of the international community and international law, 
especially through two world wars, states  decided to create independent 
international entities which would coordinate and govern states’ 
behaviors in certain sector-specific areas, such as collective security (the 
United Nations (UN)) and international financial regulation (the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)).  
Therefore, the modern tenets of public international law, in 
particular those related to IOs’ legal personality, tend to provide useful 
insights on IOs’ organizational autonomy.43 The ICJ, in its Reparation 
case, ruled that an IO is “a subject of international law and capable of 
possessing international rights and duties.” 44  Based on this legal 
capability, an IO holds the capacity to sue a state, regardless of its 
membership to the organization, for damage caused by a violation by the 
state of its obligation toward the organization.45 It is in this line that the 
International Law Commission (ILC) is working to create a draft 
governing legal responsibility for damage that an IO may cause to states 
                                                 
43 But see Giuseppe Marchegiano, The Juristic Character of the International 
Commission of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse, 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 339, 339 (1931) (finding 
the notion of international personalities as debatable). 
44 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949], ICJ Rep 
174, at 179. 
45 Id. 
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or other IOs.46 Charters of most IOs confirm this position. For example, 
Article 104 of the UN stipulates that “the Organization shall enjoy in the 
territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary 
for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.”47 
Article 8:1 of the WTO Agreement also provides that “the WTO shall 
have legal personality, and shall be accorded by each of its Members 
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its 
functions.”48 
Public international law also recognizes yet another important 
attribute derived from the notion of autonomy, i.e., an “identity” of IOs, 
by accentuating IOs’ distinctive functional mandate or competence. For 
example, the ICJ rejected the World Health Organization (WHO)’s 
request to the court to deliver an advisory opinion as to whether states’ 
use of nuclear weapons violates international law on the ground that 
such an issue did not fall within the rubric of the WHO’s activities.49 
This decision acknowledges a distinguishable mission of each IO which 
tends to merit organizational autonomy based on regulatory 
professionalism to the extent that an empty shell, as conventional IR 
theorists view IOs, cannot fully capture in exclusive reliance upon inter-
state cooperation.  
Admittedly, the mere existence of an IO’s legal personality should 
not necessarily be equated with “a life apart from the will of the 
individual states which formed the membership of the organization.”50 
Legal capacity may not be a sufficient condition for genuine autonomy. 
Varying institutional arrangements of IOs determine different patterns 
of governance and different degrees of autonomy. Although the UN 
holds its own legal personality, it is incapable of making any 
autonomous decisions over critical subjects, such as security, against 
wills of a handful of powerful members who retain veto powers. 
Furthermore, even if an IO does enjoy a certain level of autonomy, 
                                                 
46 International Law Commission (ILC), Analytical Guide: Responsibility of 
International Organizations, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/9_11.htm.  
47 Charter of United Nations, art. 104, available at 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.  
48 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994, 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, art. VIII:1 [hereinafter WTO Agreement], LEGAL INSTRUMENTS–RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 6, 6-18; 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144-1153 (1994). 
49 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1 ICJ Rep. 
226 [1996]. 
50 David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality 
and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 277 (1995-1996). 
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sovereign states, which “transfer” part of their own autonomy to the IO, 
may want to retract such a transfer.51 
Nonetheless, an IO’s legal-institutional detachment from its 
members is still an important avenue for its socio-political autonomy in 
action. In line with Weberian legal-rational authority in bureaucracy, 
legal personality tends to benefit an IO in claiming its decisional 
authority upon various issues and challenges falling within the rubric of 
its mandate. In addition, along with this legal capacity follows other 
institutional software and hardware with which to maintain its 
operational autonomy, such as operational rules, secretariat and the 
budget.  
 Approaching IOs’ autonomy through a legal lens has a number of 
benefits. First, it certainly corroborates the aforementioned 
constructivist, sociological IR theories which recognize the autonomy of 
IOs. In fact, as discussed above, it is legal personality which mobilizes 
and institutes an indispensable set of bureaucratic resources and 
appliances necessary to sustain IOs’ autonomous operation. As a legal 
entity, an IO can retain legal rights and obligations. For example, an IO 
may demand its members to pay their dues. More importantly, an IO’s 
legal personhood enables us to employ “legal principles and legal 
arguments” with which we investigate and study “the ways in which 
international organizations conduct their affairs.” 52  Those legal 
narratives offer unique perspectives in understanding IOs’ autonomy, 
such as “making consistent decisions on similar facts” and “giving 
reasoned arguments based on principles other than mere promotion of 
[a state]’s self-interest,” which conventional IR theories may not fully 
capture in their own languages.53  
These legal discourses inform, inter alia, two paramount issues 
which concern and shape the autonomy of IOs: what IOs produce and 
how they develop. First, some legal scholars have already highlighted 
various noticeable “jurisgenerative”54 phenomena in certain areas within 
sector-specific regulatory IOs. These scholars often focus on vibrant 
government regulatory networks harbored by those IOs in which 
epistemic socialization among likely-minded government officials and 
other professionals crystallize into tangible normative products, such as 
guidelines and recommendations.55 Markedly, legally defined mandates 
                                                 
51 ANNA MEIJKNECHT, TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: THE POSITION OF 
MINORITIES AND INDIGENOUS 38 (2001).  
52 KIRGIS, supra note _ , at vii-viii. 
53 Id., at viii. 
54 See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: 
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 110 (Martha Minow et al eds., 1992). 
55 See notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through 
Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Michael Byers ed. 2000); 
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and membership flowing from, and anchored by, its legal personality 
tend to secure specialization and professional authority for these IOs. 
These regulatory IOs are represented not by government officials from 
the Department of State or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but by 
transgovernmental regulators from sector-specific departments, such as 
the Department of Treasury or the Ministry of Finance, who “share a 
common concern that spans geographical boundaries and transcends 
cultural barriers.” 56  An IO’s legal personality tends to promote this 
“mentalités collectives” by providing professional forums which enjoy a 
certain level of detachment from a culture of direct delegation from the 
headquarters.57  
For example, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) harbors a transgovernmental network of 
securities regulators whose collective goals are articulated in a 
professional, not ambassadorial, fashion, i.e., to “establish standards 
and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions.”58 
The IOSCO has issued a number of professional standards within its 
mandate, such as the “Risk Management and Control Guidance for 
Securities Firms and their Supervisors.” 59  Despite its non-binding 
nature, firms in each jurisdiction expect to implement these regulatory 
prototypes.60 This normative authority, as it is repeated and reinforced, 
tends to equip these IOs with an aura of professional legitimacy which in 
turn leads to a certain level of self-rule. 
                                                                                                                                 
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Sungjoon Cho, 
Transgovernmentalism: A New Jurisgenerative Mechanism (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the author). This idea of government (transgovernmental) networks dates 
back to the 1970’s. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental 
Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL.39, 44 (1974); Raymond F. 
Hopkins, Global Management Networks: The Internationalization of Domestic 
Bureaucracies, 30 INT. SOC. SCI. J. 31, 31 (1978). Some scholars describe this term 
differently, but for more or less the same meaning. For instance, One scholar named 
the Basel Accord as a “gentlemen’s agreement among central banks”. Hal Scott, The 
Competitive Implications of the Basel Capital Accord, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 885, 885 
(1995). Another scholar termed the same work as “international soft law”. JOSEPH JUDE 
NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 176-77 261-262 
(1995). 
56 John E. Shockey, Bank Regulatory Examination and Enforcement after Barings 
and Daiwa, 935 PLI / CORP. 681, 708 (1996). 
57 John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 139, 157 (1993). 
58 The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), General 
Information on IOSCO, available at http://www.iosco.org/about/.  
59 IOSCO, Risk Management and Control Guidance for Securities Firms and their 
Supervisors: A Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO (May 1998), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD78.pdf.  
60 Id., at 1. 
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Second, the legal personality of an IO is also inductive to a 
dynamic understanding of its authentic institutional self, i.e., its identity. 
Since the juridical personhood warrants a certain level of permanence in 
its institutional existence, in particular vis-à-vis mere agreements 
(treaties), one can engage in a serious exploration of its unique pathway 
from creation through the subsequent institutional evolution as a legally 
distinct entity (person). This facilitates a panoramic comprehension of 
the IO’s operational autonomy. From a normative perspective, forming 
an IO’s identity means establishing institutional criteria for behaviors or 
policies acceptable to the IO. Throughout its institutional lifetime, an IO 
embraces a different set of policies determined by its own understanding 
of its rationale (object and purpose). Importantly, this understanding is 
neither inalterable nor self-containing. An IO continuously defines and 
redefines such teleological realizations as it incessantly interacts with its 
environment. Yet just as an adolescent experiences an identity crisis in 
his or her interaction with peers, an IO may be exposed to confusion and 
stresses in adjusting its goals to external demands.  
IOs’ norms and legal discourses are crystallized into the 
“technology” which represents IOs’ varying operational apparatuses, 
such as software (e.g., rules and guidelines), 61  hardware (e.g., 
committees) and humanware (e.g., staff). In the identity-forming 
process, it is this technology which guides and regulates IOs’ behaviors 
(policies). For example, an internal “teleological interpretation” has 
modified the identity of World Bank from a narrow development 
organization as stipulated in Article 1 of its charter (Articles of 
Agreement), which would more or less tackle members’ economic well-
being calculated by per capita income, to a more broadly mandated 
organization which now addresses comprehensive socio-cultural issues, 
such as women’s rights, the environment, education, and health.62  
 
III. Theorizing an Identity Crisis of International 
Organizations 
 
A. Anthropomorphism: IOs as Identity-Bearers 
 
As discussed above, legal narratives tend to make unique 
contributions in understanding the operational autonomy of IOs in their 
                                                 
61 See e.g., Georg Ress, The Interpretation of the Charter, in THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS – A COMMENTARY 28 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) (discussing 
“evolutionary dynamic interpretation”). 
62 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Dynamic Evolution of International Organizations: 
The Case of the World Bank, 2 J. HIS. INT’L L. 217, 249 (2000). 
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organizational lifetimes, i.e., how they evolve and what they generate, 
which eventually supply the foundation for the formation of their 
identities. One possible way of advancing the IOs’ identity formation is 
to project this normative process to a well-established paradigm of 
human developmental psychology. A careful reflection on an IO’s nature 
tends to warrant this anthropomorphism.  
As a juridical person, an IO is an autonomous, organic entity 
which owes its existence to its own incessant adaptations to the ever-
changing environment in a similar way in which a human being does. 
Unlike a closed system, such as a cybernetic system, in which inputs 
from the environment can never change internal elements of an 
organization, both humans and organizations are “open systems” which 
are “capable of self-maintenance on the basis of throughput of resources 
from the environment.” 63  The shift from closed to open systems 
highlights the critical significance which the environment exerts on 
organizational identity,64 as it does on the human identity. Like a human 
being, an organization pursues a homeostatic equilibrium vis-à-vis the 
external environment as it builds and adapts its individuality in its 
institutional development.65  
In fact, some organization theorists have already devoted their 
attention to certain self-conceptions collectively held by members of an 
organization in the name of “organizational identity,” which is defined 
as a “central, enduring, and distinctive” set of values “that distinguishes 
the organization from others with which it might be compared.”66 This 
notion of organizational identity offers yet more support for using an  
identity theory analogy in studying the dynamic transformation of IOs.  
 
B. Insights from Developmental Psychology: The Identity 
Theory 
 
A pre-eminent developmental psychologist, Erik Erikson, 
suggests that a human being develops her (ego) identity by combining 
her understanding of the environment (group identity) and her own 
personal characters (personal identity). 67  A person’s identity is 
                                                 
63 SCOTT, supra note _, at 89; WALTER BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS 
THEORY 50 (1967). 
64 Ness & Brechin, supra note _ , at 249. 
65 SCOTT, supra note _ , at 60. 
66 Stuart Albert & David A. Whetten, Organizational Identity, in RESEARCH IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (vol. 6) 265 (L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw eds. 1985). 
67 See notably ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY, YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968). See also Willem L. 
Wardekker, Identity, Plurality, and Education, in THE YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF 
EDUCATION (1995), available at http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-
Yearbook/95_docs/wardekker.html.  
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“constituted by a configuration of central traits … that typically make a 
systematic difference to the course of a person’s life, to the habit-
forming and action-guiding social categories in which she is placed, to 
the way that she acts, reacts, and interacts.”68 Erikson’s approach is 
often dubbed “psychosocial”: he basically posits that the “individual and 
society are intricately woven, dynamically related in continual 
change.”69 His theory “interrelate[d] societal demands and individual 
internal forces of development” in discussing the identity and its 
formation.70 
Erikson’s theory of identity-formation focuses on, inter alia, a 
dynamic pathway of human psychology in which an individual human 
being searches for, and eventually establishes, her genuine identity. This 
dynamic pathway is based on a human being’s need to cope incessantly 
with the inevitable conflicts between prior and subsequent 
identifications with the environment as well as between the different 
social roles that these identifications may carry with them. At first, a 
child is “deeply and exclusively ‘identified’ with his parents.” 71 
Subsequently, children also tend to “attach” themselves to other 
particular adults around them, such as their teachers and parents of 
their friends, and often imitate these adults’ occupations.72 Adolescence, 
as the last stage of childhood, ends only when an individual replaces her 
childhood identifications with a new type of identification resulting from 
socialization and competition among its peers.73 Only after the “selective 
repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications” are 
attuned to a new configuration which the society recognizes will the true 
identity of an individual is to be formed.  
The final identity, although it includes all significant 
identifications with key figures of the past, processes them in a way 
which builds a “unique and reasonably coherent whole.”74 During the 
final stage of identity formation, adolescents tend to suffer greatly from 
role confusion.75 Past multiple identifications, and the roles which they 
prescribe, often conflict with each other. This disturbance is tantamount 
                                                 
68 A.O. Rorty & D. Wong, Aspects of Identity and Agency, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND 
MORALITY: ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 19 (O. Flanagan & A.O. Rorty ed. 1990). 
69 ERIKSON, supra note _ , at 114. See also Jane Kroger, Identity Formation, in THE 
FUTURE OF IDENTITY: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LEGACY OF ERIK ERIKSON 61-63 
(Kenneth Hoover ed. 2004); JANE KROGER, IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: ADOLESCENCE 
THROUGH ADULTHOOD 25 (2nd ed. 2007). 
70 KROGER, supra note _ , at 25. 
71 ERIKSON, supra note _ , at 115. 
72 Id., at 122. 
73 Id., at 155. 
74 Id., at 161. 
75 Id., at 163-64. 
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to a crisis or “a war within themselves.”76 Only after adolescents weather 
this Strum und Drang do they acquire a sense of “knowing where [they 
are] going.” 77  Then, they finally discover their “fittedness” in the 
society.78 In this sense, the identity crisis is more of a “necessary turning 
point,” rather than an “impending catastrophe.”79 
However, identity formation is not always successful. Adolescents 
often demonstrate a variety of pathological symptoms in the course of 
identity formation. They may fail to resolve “strains” in their 
engagement with others, which leads to a state of “a loss of center and a 
dispersion.” 80  Erikson has labeled these pathologies as “identity 
confusion” or “identity diffusion.” For example, they may make no 
commitments, or show no fidelity, to their genuine identity as they 
experience no identity crisis.81 They may also act baby-like (“diffusion of 
time perspective”), become unable to work or concentrate (“diffusion of 
industry”), or choose to be anti-social and hostile (“negative identity”).82 
Other problematic identity statuses are “foreclosure,” in which 
adolescents have already made commitments to a certain identity 
without exploring various identities, and “moratorium,” in which 
adolescents merely engage in such exploration without making any 
commitments.83 
 
C. Applying the Identity Theory to IOs 
 
Similar to adolescents’ identity formation process, IOs also 
experience certain socialization pressures from their environment and 
are often forced to diversify their institutional selves into multiple roles 
which should eventually be integrated into an internally coherent 
identity.84 Naturally, the identity formation is not a smooth process for 
either a human being or an IO. It may be accompanied by confusion, 
fatigue and stress. In short, it is a crisis.  
                                                 
76 Id., at 17. 
77 Id., at 165. 
78 Id., at 161. 
79 Id., at 16. 
80 Id., at 212. 
81 James E. Marcia, Development and Validation of Ego Identity Statuses, 3 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY. 551-558 (1966). To some scholars identity diffusion may be 
characterized as “identity deficit” or “motivation crisis” which denotes a lack of 
commitments and precise self-definition. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Two Kinds of 
Identity Crisis, 53 J. PERSONALITY, 407, 409-11 (1985). 
82 Id., at 167-73. 
83 Id. 
84 Susan Harter, Self and Identity Development, in AT THE THRESHOLD: THE 
DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 358 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds. 1990). 
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As a legal person an IO’s identity crisis can be translated into a 
normative process. As discussed above, identity-forming organizational 
changes, which are inevitable for an IO’s institutional survival, are 
basically teleological85 and constitutive since these changes define and 
redefine its organizational goals, and thus regulate the behavior of 
members and the organization itself.86 This teleological and constitutive 
process is best captured by norms and legal discourse within an IO. 
Legal principles and legal arguments mediate “intersubjective” or 
“reflective” discourse and interaction among members, as well as 
between members and the IO itself.87 In sum, norms provide, and alter, 
the syntax and grammar of an IO’s institutional operation both in the 
short-term, and in the long-term.  
If an IO cannot survive its identity crisis, it fails to achieve its true 
identity. First, in the face of challenges by the changing environment, it 
may still remain attached to an old identification which has been 
prescribed by its creators, i.e., states. This unresponsiveness to the 
environment, which may be equivalent to “foreclosure” in human 
psychology, eventually leads to “inefficient, self-defeating behavior.”88 
Second, if an IO is confused by multiple identifications and fails to 
commit itself to one coherent identity, its identity is diffused (“identity 
diffusion”). Identity diffusion, as in foreclosure, is a pathological 
symptom. It gravely reduces the output level of an IO. IOs may even 
cease to exist due to these pathologies.89 
 
D. Four Parameters of Identity Formation: History, 
Environment, Purpose and Technology 
 
The history of IOs renders an initial influence on their identities. 
As an internalized past, the history tends to determine, or at least co-
relates with, present and future behaviors of IOs by frontloading their 
rationale and character. Like DNAs in the human body, the 
organizational history bestows upon IOs a certain institutional heredity, 
which marks a unique path-dependence for each organization. The 
organizational history is often used as an interpretive criterion for 
                                                 
85 Ness & Brechin, supra note _ , at 246. 
86 Keohane, supra note _ , at 382. 
87 See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992). 
88 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note _ , at 722-24. (discussing “insulation” as one of 
IOs’ pathologies).  
89 See Cheryl Shanks et al., Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International 
Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992, 50 INT’L ORG. 593, 594 (1996) (observing 
that IOs “do have a mortality rate, and it can be surprisingly high”). 
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determining whether organizations’ or their participants’ behaviors are 
permitted or prohibited under their charters or constitutions. 90 
Interestingly, the tenacious impact of history on each IO’s identity 
formation stems from the fact that it cannot be simply discarded or 
disposed of even if it subsequently becomes obsolete or ineffective. 
Purging an old organization and restarting afresh would be quite costly. 
In this sense, all institutional changes tend to be path-dependent. “If 
sunk costs make a traditional pattern of action cheaper, and if new 
patterns are not more profitable enough to justify throwing away the 
resource, the sunk costs tend to preserve a pattern of action from one 
year to the next.”91 Old habits die hard. Relics of the old structure or 
culture remain, even though they may be cocooned beneath a new 
institutional coating.  
However, this perspective on the organizational history need not 
be static. To conventional IR theorists who emphasize the genesis, 
rather than the subsequent change, of IOs, the organizational history is 
nothing but a reflection, or a repository, of interests and preferences of 
states at the time of creation. As a tool of these states used to achieve 
certain goals, an IO is supposed to implement institutional blueprints 
which were programmed into its history. At this stage, an IO is mostly 
subordinate to states, and hence has little autonomy. (Figure 1)  In 
contrast, organizational sociologists and/or historical institutionalists 
view organizational history as a dynamic factor which embodies “critical 
junctures” in organizational development. 92  These critical historical 
moments can trigger an irreversible path-dependence that is quite 
different from the one that was pre-ordained by states. 93  In this 
situation, an IO may gradually begin to exert its (new) identity upon 
states (Figure 2). At a subsequent stage as this process deepens, and an 
IO’s transformed identity prevails upon even the interests and 
preferences of the powerful states who previously determined its old 
identity. (Figure 3)  
                                                 
90 See e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 332, art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of 
its conclusion, …”) (emphasis added). 
91 ARTHUR. L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 120-21 (1968). 
92 PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
(2004); Kathleen Thelen, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics, 2 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 369 (1999). 
93 Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary 
Political Science, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 693 (Ira Katznelson & 
Helen V. Milner eds. 2002). 
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In sum, advocates for an IO’s autonomy/identity envisage a 
seamless continuum in the IO’s evolution that is characterized by certain 
critical junctures, or in a more normative sense, “constitutional 
moments.” 94  The unique culture, structure and path-dependency of 
each IO also begets a unique institutional arrangement, such as inter-
governmental or supranational organization, which tends to mark and 
define an IO’s identity. Therefore, from this standpoint, the process of 
identity formation is a new history-making process. 
The environment is a critical parameter to an organizational 
identity. If one regards an IO as a closed system, a mere tool for states, 
as conventional IR theorists do, then the environment may not matter  
since an IO is only supposed to take what states provide (input) and 
produce pre-programmed results (output). However, organizational 
sociologists have long adhered to an open system where varying 
environments exert critical impact on how organizations behave and 
perform.95 This unremitting process of challenge and response between 
an IO and the environment builds up its unique identity. An IO 
processes complex information provided by the environment and forms 
its identity in accordance with the messages contained in those 
challenges.96 In this sense, the identity-formation process of an IO is an 
assiduous dialogue with the environment.97 
                                                 
94 Helfer, supra note _ , at 662, n. 45. 
95 HOWARD ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS _ (1979).  
96 Yash P. Gupta & David C.W. Chin, Organizational Life Cycle: A Review and 
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97 See Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623, 625 
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international legal system, it is not possible to analyse the WTO constitution fully 
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Yet the environment provides IOs with not only opportunities but 
also challenges. It forces IOs to change their identifications with the old 
self embedded in the charter.98 It redefines the old self, which has lost 
practicality and effectiveness due to obsolescence and desuetude. 99 
From an economic perspective, this identity-formation process is a 
function of altered opportunity costs in response to environmental 
changes.100 
An IO’s objective and purpose is the rationale of its existence. 
Initially, it is given by an IO’s creators (states) and engraved in its 
charter, as discussed above. Yet as an IO achieves its identity through 
dynamic (historical) development, it also alters, or at least fine-tunes, 
the original objective and purpose. In other words, organizational goals 
must be adjustable for organizations to survive. 101  Empirical 
confirmations for this goal dynamism are seen in the phenomena of 
“mission creep” of major international organizations, such as the IMF 
and the World Bank.102  
An organizational identity shares the same developmental 
pathway with an organizational goal. An organizational identity is 
shaped by an IO’s conscious interactions with the environment, and 
guided by an organization’s own role expectation as well as the 
expectations the organization perceives from the environment (society). 
This whole process of identity formation is driven by an organization’s 
evolving notion of purpose that continuously builds throughout its 
institutional lifetime. In this context, both goals and identities are 
“cultural-cognitive and normative.” 103  Therefore, both goals and 
identities steer, regulate and control IOs’ activities. Goals also provide 
essential interpretive guidance when IOs’ determine whether a certain 
action is acceptable. 104  In this regard, as Selznick noted, an 
                                                 
98 Shihata, supra note _ , at 218. 
99 Id. 
100 Keohane, supra note _ , at 390; DOUGLAS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN 
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102 See e.g., Jessica Einhorn, The World Bank’s Mission Creep, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 
(Sep./Oct. 2001) (arguing that member countries of the World Bank should control the 
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organizational goal can be an “ideological weapon” with which to defy 
opposition and mobilize support from the environment.105  
Finally, an IO’s “core technology” 106  refers to its functional 
capability to perform in order to achieve its goals. It delineates its 
domain, and eventually its identity, by determining the “range of 
products or services it provides and the types of clients or consumers 
served.”107 The IMF’s identity as a financial organization is inextricably 
linked to the fact that it is capable of monitoring and regulating 
international financial flows. The identity of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as a health organization is also connected 
inseparably to the fact that it can monitor and regulate health-related 
matters, such as the distribution of flu vaccines. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s identity as a nuclear energy 
organization hinges on the fact that it can monitor and regulate nuclear 
energy issues, such as peaceful use of atomic energy.  
As an open system, an organization can import technology from 
its environment. 108  When interacting with its environment, it can 
change the core technology by modifying its software (skills and other 
social knowledge), humanware (personnel and bureaucrats) and 
hardware (infrastructure and sub-organizations). 109  Organizational 
theories characterize this transformative process of acquiring and 
embracing new technologies as “organizational learning”. 110 
Organizational learning is a purposeful behavior to increase IOs’ 
problem-solving (functional) capacities to achieve certain institutional 
goals, and therefore plays a critical role in shaping organizational 
identities.  
 
IV. An Application of the Identity Theory: A Case of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) 
 
                                                 
105 PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL 
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A. From a Contractual Tool (GATT) to an Autonomous 
Organization (WTO) 
 
As one of the many chapters of a much more ambitious yet 
eventually aborted project of the International Trade Organization (ITO), 
the GATT was originally more of a contractual document than an 
organization. The GATT participants were named contracting parties, 
rather than members. They created the GATT against the background of 
mutually destructive protectionist trade policies in the interwar period, 
which had diminished world trade by seventy percent and thus 
contributed to the outbreak of World War II.111 Drawing on this bitter 
historical lesson, contracting parties aimed to dismantle trade barriers 
and achieve free trade by regularly holding tariff reduction talks in a 
series of negotiation rounds provided by the GATT.  
While trade negotiation was basically a reciprocal, diplomatic and 
political exercise, contracting parties had to preserve the hard-won 
delicate balance of concessions that each negotiation had produced. In 
other words, they had to maintain the values of those concessions by 
prohibiting parties from introducing any measures which might 
neutralize them later. Such cheating had to be condemned, and 
remedies instituted to restore the balance of concessions. Therefore, the 
GATT, albeit a legal document, was basically a tool for contracting 
parties that were pre-occupied by bargains’ original terms. This 
instrumental, contractual structure of the GATT is evidenced by the 
relics of private (contract) law embedded in the old GATT jurisprudence. 
The remedial prototype of the GATT was “nullification or impairment,” 
which is close to the notion of injuries or damages in contract law.  
Regardless of whether the measure in question is consistent with GATT 
norms, any injuries to a contracting party, i.e., the dilution of benefits of 
its concession, should be remedied to preserve the balance of 
concessions made in the previous negotiation.112 In this context, GATT 
dispute resolution panels often explored whether and how much a 
defendant’s measure brought actual adverse commercial effects to the 
complainant.113  
                                                 
111 See Edward C. Luck, American Exceptionalism and International Organization: 
Lessons from the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE 
UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al eds. 
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L. REV. 763, 766-67 (2004) (discussing the multilateral trading system (GATT/WTO)’s 
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113 See e.g., Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machinery, Oct. 23, 
1958, GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, ¶ 17, 20 (1959) [WTO Doc. Symbol 
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However, this instrumental (contractual) structure of the GATT 
changed as it became more institutionalized and more equipped with 
software (norms and practices), hardware (divisions and offices), and 
humanware (personnel). The GATT began to focus more on the public 
law aspect of its member states, such as the stability and predictability of 
the rule of law.. As the former Director of the WTO Appellate Body 
Secretariat Debra Steger aptly described, the GATT slowly evolved into 
“something greater than a contract that could be withdrawn from by any 
contracting party whenever it found the obligations too onerous.”114 In 
the same line, the once critical notion of “nullification or impairment” 
was weakened as it was assumed away whenever a panel found a 
“violation.” 115  In fact, any violation would ipso facto constitute a 
nullification or impairment. 116  This paradigm shift, from a power-
oriented structure focusing on the outcome of negotiation to a rule-
oriented structure valuing the legal system within the GATT, paved the 
ground for a critical transformation from a contract to an 
organization. 117  As Anne Krueger aptly observed, the WTO’s 
organizational autonomy, i.e., its legal personality, tends to justify an 
institutional evolution from the old GATT, which had been deemed an 
instrument of contracting parties, to an independent organization.118 
 
B. The WTO’s Identity Crisis 
 
The legalization, or judicialization, of the GATT through its 
dispute settlement system contributed greatly to its institutionalization. 
Its panel system functioned quite effectively in resolving trade disputes 
between contracting parties. Critically, the GATT not only resolved trade 
disputes but also generated a rich set of jurisprudence in the area of 
international trade law. The rule of law which the GATT established was 
the most valuable product produced by the GATT as an organization. 
This legalization, or rule of law, in the trade area enabled the GATT to 
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117 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109-11 (2d ed. 1997). 
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process information and further build up its unique technology, i.e., 
trade governance or trade management. Contracting parties increasingly 
relied on the GATT in acquiring information and addressing various 
problems concerning trade. In sum, the GATT consolidated its 
identification with what it was meant to be, i.e., a trade agreement.  
However, the environment surrounding the GATT was changing 
dramatically in the 1980’s as the pro-trade bias of the GATT came under 
attack. The rising ethos of the “welfare state” urged governments to 
improve social hygiene in the areas of environment and human health. 
The problem is that the proliferation of these social regulations might 
have potentially undermined free trade goals since trade restriction due 
to regulatory heterogeneity tends to become increasingly painful in 
times of growing interdependence.119 Under certain circumstances, these 
new domestic regulations, as non-tariff barriers (NTBs), can be abused 
as a disguised form of protectionism.120  
The GATT first defied the rising tide of (re-) regulation by striking 
down these regulations as trade-restrictive. Although there existed the 
general exception clause (GATT Article XX) under which these 
regulations might be justified, not a single measure was ever actually 
saved under the clause in the GATT’s history.121 For example, in 1990 a 
                                                 
119 A number of scholars have already paid attention to this phenomenon. For instance, 
Sol Picciotto observed that: 
“Regulatory regimes have been brought into greater interaction as the removal 
of direct barriers to the flows of goods and money between states (tariffs, 
quotas and exchange controls) has shifted attention towards regulatory 
difference as a barrier to entry of commodities or capital.”  
Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction between Jurisdictions and the 
Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE 
AND THE UNITED STATES 89 (William Bratton et al eds. 1996). Likewise, some 
economists have also noted that: 
“As globalization proceeds, however, it has become increasingly evident that 
one nation’s economic policies can affect other countries. When nations were 
separated by high trade barriers and trade flows were limited, one country 
could ignore another nation’s domestic economic policies. As barriers have 
come down, other countries’ domestic policies have become much more 
important.”  
GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 89 (Gary Burtless et al eds. 
1998). See also Aaditya Mattoo, Discriminatory Consequences of Non-Discriminatory 
Standards, WTO, WTO STAFF WORKING PAPERS, TISD-96-01, Dec. 1997, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/wpaps_e.htm (last visited on April 19, 
2001). 
120 See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond 
the Entropic Dilemma, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625, 643 (2005). 
121 See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and 
the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the 
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GATT panel struck down the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes as 
unnecessary trade restriction.122 In this case, the Thai government tried 
to protect its people from a number of identifiable harms from 
chemicals and toxins contained in foreign cigarettes by banning those 
products. In fact, the WHO also endorsed such ban. However, the panel 
ruled that the ban was an unjustifiable violation of the GATT rules since 
the Thai government could have found less trade restrictive means than 
the ban, such as the “strict, non-discriminatory labeling and ingredient 
disclosure regulations.” 123 This ruling was severely criticized not only 
because it ignored the WHO’s opinion but also because its prescription 
to the Thai government, i.e., labeling and disclosure regulations, was 
both unaffordable and ineffective for developing countries like Thailand 
at that time.124 
Therefore, while a pro-trade bias was faithful to the GATT’s 
identification as a trade agreement, such a bias continuously invited 
criticism from its environment, in particular the civil society and 
environmental organizations. The GATT’s efforts to fix this bias and 
achieve a more mature identity gathered critical momentum in the 
launch of the WTO. The WTO’s mission statement in the preamble of its 
charter spotlights “sustainable development.” It has become obvious 
that due consideration and investment for non-trade values, such as the 
environment and human health, should be made within the WTO in 
order to achieve any development which is sustainable. One can 
understand the creation of the Trade and Environment Committee and 
special side agreements, such as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS), as the WTO’s effort to grow out of the pro-trade bias 
and form a more mature and responsive identity.125  
Those who advocate a formal (hard) linkage between trade and 
social values tend to argue that certain “social clauses,” which include 
fundamental workers' rights or minimum international labor standards, 
                                                                                                                                 
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 142 
(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2000). 
122 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted 
on Nov. 7, 1990, B.I.S.D. 37S/200. 
123 Id., para. 77. 
124 See e.g., David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets 
and Health in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 200-1 (1999) 
(criticizing the Thai Cigarette panel’s interpretation of “necessary to protect human 
health”). 
125 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A REFORM 
AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003). See also Veijo Heiskanen, The 
Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1 (2004). 
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should be normatively incorporated into the WTO system.126 Under this 
position, (rich) WTO members may restrict imports from other (poor) 
members if the latter’s social conditions or practices violate these social 
standards. Despite their ostensible moralistic streaks, these debates on 
hard linkage are in fact testimonial to the WTO’s identity crisis. The 
WTO is continuously receiving demands for these regulatory roles and is 
thus exposed to different role identifications (with labor or 
environmental organizations) beyond its base trade organization 
identity. Perhaps the WTO might be a victim of its own success. The 
unprecedented success of the GATT/WTO, in particular its dispute 
settlement mechanism, tends to make many social issues gravitate 
towards this trade organization.127 This gravitational force presses the 
WTO to agonize over diverse role expectations.128  
Critically, however, such hard linkage risks undermining the 
WTO’s core values, i.e., free trade.129 In other words, the WTO risks 
suffering from a form of “identity diffusion.” If the WTO authorizes 
members to freely restrict imports from other members which allegedly 
violate those social standards, the WTO’s old identity as a trade 
organization would be severely undermined since it would fail to uphold 
trade values. At the same time, however, the WTO would not be 
identified as a different regulatory (labor or environmental) 
organization since the WTO’s contribution via hard linkage to those 
social causes would nonetheless be questionable for the following 
reasons.  
In general, social standards are lower for developing countries 
than developed countries simply because the former countries are 
poorer than the latter. 130  Without addressing this inherent 
                                                 
126 See e.g., Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social 
Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in Fair Trade and Harmonization (vol. 2) 177, 
223 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds. 1996); Dani Rodrik, Developing 
Countries after the Uruguay Round, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH 
WORKING PAPER NO. 1084 (1994) (proposing a “social safeguards” clause based on core 
labor rights in the WTO). 
127 See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 AM J INTl L 
28, 29 (2002); Sylvia Ostry, The WTO and International Governance, in THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION MILLENNIUM ROUND: FREER TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
285, 290, 293 (Klaus Günter Deutsch and Bernhard Speyer, eds. 2001); José E. Alvarez, 
How Not To Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 
WIDENER L SYMP J 1, 15 (2001). 
128 Tomer Broude analyzed this problem in the area of trade and development. See 
Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the 
Functional and Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 221 
(2006). 
129 See Kym Anderson, Environmental and Labor Standards: What Role for the WTO?, 
in THE WTO AS AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 243-45 (Anne O. Krueger ed. 1998). 
130 Id., at 244. 
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developmental disparity, merely exerting sanctions on poor countries 
would never achieve a satisfactory level of protection for putative 
societal concerns. On the contrary, such ventures (hard linkage) will 
only encroach on poor countries’ comparative advantages, such as cheap 
labor, and thus generate serious tensions between rich and poor 
countries without affecting the root cause of the problem. 131  Rich 
countries may even be tempted to use these regulatory concerns as 
convenient excuses for raising trade barriers, as seen in green or blue 
protectionism.132 Then, the WTO will perform neither a trade nor a non-
trade function, and its identity would therefore be lost. This would be 
tantamount to identity diffusion for the WTO. 
This risk of identity diffusion might also be found in yet another 
linkage of “trade and development.” During its first decade, the WTO 
has failed to narrow the income gap between the rich and the poor. The 
least-developed countries’ marginalization from the mainstream global 
trading system and the subsequent abject poverty in these countries 
seriously questioned the rationale of the WTO. 133  This development 
deficiency134 drove the WTO towards yet another identification as it 
launched the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001. Yet, as Tomer 
Broude observed, the rhetoric of a “development” round might not fully 
match the technology (capacity) of the WTO.135 Nonetheless, if the WTO 
attempts to achieve development goals by affording developing 
countries rule exemptions in the name of “special and differential 
treatment,” it might be counterproductive because it would eventually 
hurt development by “discouraging effective efforts to integrate into the 
world economy.”136  
In confronting the risk of identity diffusion, some might argue 
that the WTO should never be involved in these non-trade regulatory 
issues, and instead focus on traditional narrow trade issues.137 Yet, this 
impulsive reaction tends to usher in yet another risk of failed identity 
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formation, i.e., “foreclosure.” In other words, the WTO may be 
preoccupied by its own “ritualized behavior,” i.e., its pro-trade bias, 
which is totally unresponsive and unaccountable to the larger social 
environment.138 Such “insulation” from its environment and refusal to 
process the meaningful information provided by its environment tend to 
undermine its legitimacy, and is thus detrimental to the organization’s 
survival.139  
 
C. Toward the WTO’s Identity Achievement 
 
As is the case in a human individual, the WTO’s identity 
formation or identity achievement is inseparable from its recognition of 
its inevitable connectedness to its environment. The WTO is an open, 
not a self-contained, system.140 The WTO interacts with, responds to, 
and is even influenced by its environment. Importantly, however, the 
WTO’s openness does not deprive itself of an “autopoietic” nature as an 
organization which preserves its “operative closure.”141 The status quo of 
the WTO in terms of its capacity (technology) and resources, which are 
the very product of its hitherto institutional development, stipulates its 
central identity as a trade organization. As of now, the WTO cannot, and 
should not, become a human rights organization or an environmental 
organization. The WTO may accommodate these non-trade values in 
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various ways by voluntarily adjusting its own internal legal and 
institutional choices in the course of its evolution.142 Yet these non-trade 
values must not be “imposed” on the WTO externally as they force the 
WTO to accept norms and consequences which are inconsistent with its 
current identity.143  
Therefore, a desirable form of identity formation for the WTO will 
be to attain an institutional equilibrium between trade and non-trade 
(social) regulatory values without losing its character as a trade 
organization. This equilibrium means reconciliation between trade and 
social values from the WTO’s perspective as a trade organization. This 
reconciliation should be based on the WTO’s institutional capacity, its 
core technology and its own path-dependency. In symbolic rhetoric, the 
agenda should be “trade and labor or environment” not “labor or 
environment and trade.” The WTO’s core technology, such as its 
software (jurisprudence) and hardware (committees), is capable of 
performing such reconciliation. 
First of all, via its constructive (teleological) interpretation, the 
WTO tribunal can harmonize trade and social values without losing the 
WTO’s main character. In paradigmatic cases such as Gasoline (1996)144 
and Shrimp-Turtle (1998),145 the WTO tribunal bestowed on domestic 
regulators broad discretion in establishing the content of domestic 
regulations, while it focused only on the manner in which they were 
applied.146 Under this case law, WTO members can freely pursue their 
non-trade (social) policy objectives as long as they adhere to certain 
basic (procedural) disciplines, such as good faith and due process. This 
hermeneutics is teleological in the sense that it was driven by the WTO’ s 
new telos, “sustainable development,” which is nothing but the WTO’s 
new commitment to a more balanced organizational identity than the 
old GATT.  
Therefore, these rulings represent a mature departure from the 
GATT’s narrow identification with a pro-trade bias, which, if left 
unchecked, would have led to “foreclosure” as a failure of identity 
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formation. In these cases, the WTO no longer dismissed social (human 
health) values in a blind pursuit of trade values as it did in Thai 
Cigarette. In Shrimp-Turtle, the WTO tribunal referred to non-trade 
(environmental) conventions, such as the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), in a 
serious effort to locate a common ground between the WTO and those 
environmental treaties.147  
Another way of embracing social values within the WTO without 
diffusing its identity is to pursue quasi-harmonization through 
international regulatory standards. Any hard regulatory bargaining 
within the WTO that aims for a single undertaking would be infeasible 
simply due to the WTO’s lack of core technology in these regulatory 
areas as well as the politically combustible nature of those target 
regulations.148 A more realistic way is to utilize the WTO’s pre-existing 
hardware, such as the Trade and Environment Committee and the SPS 
Committee, is to encourage WTO members to tap relevant international 
regulatory standards. 149  These committees, if well operated, can 
contribute greatly to regulatory dialogue among WTO members and 
effectively address the subtle interface between trade and regulatory 
issues. At the same time, in these committee activities the WTO can co-
opt relevant international regulatory organizations, such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”), the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”), and the "Codex 
Alimentarius Commission."  
Finally, such reconciliation may also be manifested as 
“coherence” in policy-making between the WTO and other relevant IOs. 
For example, the World Bank can help the WTO finance “technical 
assistance” projects, such as the training of government officials, to 
build the regulatory capacity of developing countries.150 The WTO and 
other IOs can also perform a joint study that identifies areas of common 
concerns and interests. The recent WTO-ILO joint study, “Trade and 
Employment: Challenges for Policy Research,” offers a good example in 
this regard.151 By identifying common interests and concerns of both 
organizations as well as defining a relationship between trade and 
employment, this type of joint study provides a fertile ground for policy 
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coherence between trade and non-trade values. Under this nuanced 
approach, the WTO can maintain fidelity to its identity as a trade 





This Essay argues that an IO, like a human being, is prone to the 
process of identity formation in establishing its autonomy from its 
members (states). As it undergoes various institutional changes, its old 
identification with an original goal may encounter a new identification 
with another purpose, and thus it may experience confusion as to its 
true identity (identity crisis). An IO can achieve a coherent institutional 
self by striking a balance between these multiple identifications under 
the constraints which various parameters, such as its environment and 
technology, impose. Yet an IO may also fail to achieve its identity by 
insulating itself from its environment (foreclosure) or being adrift in the 
middle of these multiple identifications without making any 
commitment to a final identity (identity diffusion).  
This identity theory of IOs may find in the WTO its empirical 
confirmation. As an organic institution which incessantly interacts with 
its environment, the WTO has evolved from the early GATT which was 
defined largely by a pro-trade character to the WTO whose identity 
formation has been influenced by a strong external demand for a new 
identification with non-trade (societal) values, such as protection of the 
environment and human health. The WTO’s identity formation is to 
strike an institutional equilibrium between traditional trade values and 
these non-trade values. 
Admittedly, this Essay offers little explanation on a microscopic, 
internal dynamics as to how social actors (states) of an IO affect or 
contribute to its identity formation process. This question should be 
answered by future research which will re-discover conventional IR 
theories in an attempt to build a more comprehensive, and universal, 
theory of IOs’ institutional changes.  




The identity achievement as an institutional equilibrium is 
determined by a confluence of two forces, i.e., the extent to which trade 
values are realized as a trade organization (“effectiveness”) and the 
extent to which certain non-trade values are pursued to respond to 
external demands (“responsiveness”). Given a limited amount of 
institutional resources, an optimal level of identity is a function of the 
marginal benefit (MB) of responsiveness and marginal cost (MC) of 
effectiveness. (Figure 4) Other things being equal, if the WTO’s general 
level of responsiveness increases, e.g., if the WTO devotes more time 
and energy to enhance non-trade values, the WTO’s trade-oriented 
output tends to decrease, and thus the WTO becomes less effective as a 
trade organization, even if its identity may be formed at an increased 
degree of linkage. (Figure 5)152 This decreased level of effectiveness may 
be translated as the price the WTO pays to be more responsive.  
Therefore, WTO members should beef up the WTO’s institutional 
capacity with additional resources, such as money and personnel, in 
order to increase both levels of responsiveness and effectiveness without 
necessarily compromising each other. (Figure 6) This conclusion may 
apply both to non-trade, societal concerns, such as labor and 
environment, and to new areas added in the Uruguay Round, such as the 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS). In other words, with more 
investment in these areas within the WTO, it may maintain a decent 
output level as a trade organization, while it can contribute to the better 
protection of labor, environment, and intellectual property rights.  
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institutional redesign to meet concerns of legitimate governance could lead to 
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